The term globalization has been exceedingly controversial, with current debates concerning globalization raging on whether there is such a term in the contemporary world (Unger, 1997), whether it is currently more significant than it was earlier (Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin, 1999), whether the term involves displacing a nation (Strange, 1996; Wade, 1996), in addition to whether it is more essential than localism (Fishlow and Haggard, 1992) or even regionalism (Rosenau, 1997a). In addition, there are incessant polemics as well as analyses with reference to whether the outcome is favourable of bad and for whom. Of late, such arguments have leaked over from academic journals to the roads in places marred with diversity such as Bangkok, Davos or even Seattle. With reverence to this listing of concerns, I established in this paper that globalization subsists and it is a very significant phenomenon. The main purpose is to point out some observations on the direct impact of globalization especially in terms of effects to the less developed countries.
Globalization is a comprehensive, multidisciplinary issue in its widest reaches. It embraces social, political, ideological, cultural as well as economic topics, For instance, James Rosenau, a political scientists defines globalization as “a label that is presently in vogue to account for peoples, activities, norms, ideas, goods, services, and currencies that are decreasingly confined to a particular geographic space and its local and established practices” (1997b, p.360). Making a decision of focusing on the economic facet of globalization still leaves several loose ends since economic globalization encompasses both the macroeconomic as well as microeconomic aspects. The previous one pinpoints to the industrial revolution and the overall effect at the firm level, whilst the later are interconnected to the incorporation of market for services as well as goods (Oman, 1994).
The paper will mainly focus on the macroeconomics of globalization – both finance and trade – but there is also need to draw the distinction between liberalization and globalization. The less developed countries had to take some vital steps prior to the complete effect of globalization could be felt. Exclusively, they had to lower the barriers to capital and trade flows that had been an important constituent of the import- substitution industrialization – model that nearly all assumed for some time. Devoid of these procedural shifts, globalization would be to a large extent less pertinent compared to how it is currently, predominantly in the developing world Liberalization, the opposite of globalization.
The less developed countries as a group (together with the previous communist countries of Eastern and central Europe) have turned out to be more incorporated into the world economy in the precedent twenty years as a result of the corresponding procedure of liberalization and globalization. An overview of the quick changes that occurred in the less developed countries is as shown in the table below
The Role of Developing countries in Trade and Capital Flows
Direct Investment (%)
Portfolio Investment (%)
Total (billions of $)
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook and Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.
It can be easily conceived that with respect to world imports, the developing nation’s portion slightly reduced during the 1980’s that is from 33 to 27 percent and thereafter recovered to 34 percent by the towards the close of 1990’s A comparable state was established with exports from less developed countries to the rest of the world even though the tendency is more distinct. Equally however, in both of the situations the product composition as well as the country masks the extent of increasing integrations as later explained in the paper. In addition, it is quite imperative to note down that trade flows in a broad-spectrum increased rapidly during this period, virtually tripling in nominal terms. In yet another form of thinking, concerns the rising significance of viewing trade as a share of countries’ own output such as the change in import and export coefficients.
In that same quantify, global incorporation has augmented as coefficients for developing nations employed an outline comparable to that presently seen: a reduction from the previous 24 percent in 1980 to 22 percent in 1990, afterwards a boost to 28 percent in 1997. Fiscal patterns were more remarkable than those for business operations, deteriorating further unexpectedly in the 1980s and increasing more rapidly in the 1990s. For instance, the third world nation distribute of overseas express venture plummeted from a rate of 33 percent in 1980-82, prior to the liability catastrophe strike, to a mere 14 percent by the closing stages of the decade. It subsequently further improved more to 43 percent by 1996-97. Collection patterns were alike but greatly less significant: 8 percent to 3 percent to 13 percent, correspondingly.
Fiscal flows escalated a lot quicker than trade, an ostensible enhancement of more than 11 times in this era. The symphony of fiscal flows moved in imperative behaviour. The personal bank creditors, which in the year1980 had been liable for almost two thirds of total long-standing arrears trends (which, consecutively, accounted for almost 80 percent of remaining supply flows), had nearly vanished from the sight by 1990. Furthermore, liability trends themselves had become less noteworthy by 1990, as express venture had by now come to symbolize almost one quarter of net supply flows, and authorized flows (as well as grants) had once more risen as a distribute of the whole. Throughout the path of the 1990s, the masterpiece move was sustained. The generally spectacular constituent was overseas express venture, which stood for 48 percent of overall flows in 1997 and 56 percent in 1998.
Express savings, by then had been measured the most awful category of overseas resources in the 1970s (one explanation for the change directed to bank loans) is currently measured the main precious type, as it is not only more established than previous flows but moreover grants admission to markets and expertise. A lot of additional unsteady are collection impartiality savings, bonds, and financial institutions loans. What is tremendously complicated, if not impracticable, to gauge accurately is the main disreputable sort of resources flows in the 1990s: the supposed sizzling cash. These are the flows that go in and out of nations on a very temporary foundation, looking for a rapid come back on resources.
The instability that makes them inflexible to outline also can make mayhem with economies, particularly the petite and frequently delicate economies of third world nations. Intimately connected to the change in the symphony of investment flows was the alteration in borrowers inside the third world nations. In the 1970s and the 1980s, borrowers had mostly been essential governments and nationalized organizations. In the 1990s, on the contrary, depicting the liberalization progression, borrowers were gradually larger personal segment companies. Foreign Direct Investment was, (approximately) by description, a constituent of the personal division.
Looking at third world countries as a group simply gets us so far; extra fascinating stories materialize by comparison of across areas. By far the greatest emergent region with reverence to trade was Asia, whose allocate almost doubled in the 1980s and persistent at the equal elevated point in the 1990s. In the meantime, Middle Eastern business operations drastically fell with the dive in oil prices. It was the unnaturally elevated quantity of trade in the Middle East in the early 1980s, and the afterwards deterioration, that diminished the boost of third world countries in trade flows shown table 1; apart from the Middle East, the augment was expected to be big. Africa’s contribution in global business operations also dropped drastically right through, while Latin America improved fairly in the 1990s but not to the equivalent stage as in the early on in the 1980s, furthermore affected by the function of oil. Disparity trade coefficients reflect these patterns: 36 percent in Asia at the last part of the 1990s (up from 22 percent in 1980), in comparison with 19 percent for Latin America (17 percent in 1980) and 34 percent for Africa (downwards from 39 percent). Proponents of better globalization would evidently indicate to the Asian states as samples of escalating trade paving way to tough enlargement presentation, in difference with previous areas that both developed more gradually and traded much less.
Moreover, there existed significant modifications in the distribution of investment flows amid third world state segments that reinforced trends in business dealings. Throughout the 1980s, Latin America predominantly was famished for finances from the personal segment, creating an amplified responsibility for the bilateral agencies. East and Southeast Asia, on the other hand, sustained admission to personal finances. In the 1990s, Latin America reacquired entrance to personal economics and Eastern Europe in addition turned out to be an energetic borrower, partaking the intensifying share with East/Southeast Asia. Whereas Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia persistently made their acquisitions principally on executive sources, although this ended up in little and deteriorating shares of whole supply flows.
Other insights about the character of globalization can be seen by recognizing with whom third world states do business with and from where savings comes. Based on statistics for the initial half of the 1990s, an apparent dissimilarity can be completed (Stallings and Streeck, 1995). Asian developing nations primarily traded between themselves, and with Japan, and an emergent divide of their venture also came from inside the state. In Latin America, however, trade and savings were greatly one-sided on the United States, particularly in the northern rank of states. In Africa and Eastern Europe, there was a focus on Western Globalization with an outlook from the third world Countries.
In Europe, the “tetrahedron” implied that diverse third world states were attached into the international financial system in diverse means through their economy with major trading and savings partners. Given that the particular manufacturing nations looked at altered “models” of entrepreneurship, this resulted to fairly unlike rules in the third world nations themselves. Expansion rates of the developed nations became different as well. In the 1980s and early on in 1990s, these variances led to the immense financial vitality in the Asian county, but the crumple of the Japanese financial system exacerbated the soon after inconveniences of its Asian neighbours, and the elevated intensity of interface inside the area propelled the contamination result once the calamity there began in 1997, The insulating U.S. financial system, which had seemed to be a haul on Latin America in the 1980s and early on in the 1990s, proved a benefit to its neighbours, principally Mexico, Central America, afterwards in the decade.
It is difficult to get an excellent experience for the effect of globalization and liberalization when looking at exceedingly huge aggregates of nations. A rather enhanced concept comes by considering specific counties in a distinct county. Illustration on a manuscript on Latin America that we have just completed at ECLAC, we can affix to the investigation therefore distant (Stallings and Peres, 2000; see also Stallings, 1995). The key point that is passed across is that globalization and liberalization have amplified heterogeneity between nations, segments, and genres of companies. A few have been capable of taking advantage of innovative chances, whereas others have simply come across additional huddles. Of the nine countries considered, four did considerably well in the 1990s than in the bottom episode (1950-80), whereas the last five did much poorer. (The actuality that Brazil and Mexico, the two biggest states in Latin America, are amongst the second group gives a descending partiality to presentation for the state in total when using subjective means.)
This distinction supposed for production, savings, and efficiency. Particularly great disparities were found with reverence to efficiency, which may involve sustained demarcation in the upcoming years. For nations that enhanced their presentation, overseas resources held a chief responsibility. Foreign Direct Investment particularly contributed to amplified venture, both in tradable and in the services segment. Savings in the post-liberalization era was intense in a moderately minute figure of sectors. Only one subdivision (telecommunications) experienced vibrant savings in all states, and just one nation (Chile) enlarged venture in all key divisions. Industrialized savings was mainly energetic in definite capital-intensive subdivisions like cement, chemicals, steel and petrochemicals.
However, venture coefficients in general were, at most excellent, vaguely upper than in the pre-liberalization era. Privatization was influential to savings recuperation and to transformation when other essential circumstances were also there. It fostered savings in definite tradable (for instance, mining and likely gas), even though linkages with the entire financial system sustained being feeble. In non-tradable, the main increases in savings were in telecommunications; the outcomes were assorted in electrical energy and transport. Privatization single-handedly did not warranty proficient presentation. Reinforcement of possessions privileges proved to be an essential feature for attracting overseas savings in mining, whereas improved aggressive competition pressures were required to guarantee competent market results in the services segment, like telecommunications. Huge plants were the most vibrant investors, even though minor firms had a slight attendance in some Globalization.
An outlook from the third world nation’s performance where savings grew swiftly. In the midst of big plants, corporation subsidiaries gained position with reference to hefty household conglomerates. These subsidiaries were accountable for a great deal of the savings intensification, not only in the most vibrant areas of industrial, but also in querying and telecommunications. Privatizations, liberalization of convention that prohibited overseas plants from investing in countless segments, and the globalization of significant industries pooled to reinforce the situation of overseas corporations. Nevertheless, the huge plants contributed comparatively slightly to the production of employment because they happened to be more capital-intensive.
Efficiency advantages were extra consistently extended across wide sectors like cultivation, industrialized, and services, but heterogeneity amplified inside subsectors, for instance, amid industrial and family unit farming. Similarly, inside industrialized, several subsectors performed exceptionally fine but others lagged in the rear. Regardless of output expansion, the output breach of industrials as a whole in comparison with the United States did not constricted in the 1990s. Precise subsectors in which speculation was vibrant showed a pointed boost in output and did constrict the breach. This was partially a prolongation of regulation procedure begun for the duration of or even prior to the predicament of the 1980s. Even though the breach connecting the output of huge companies and that of little and medium-size businesses lessened in a few nations, presentation persisted to be tremendously incongruent. Transformation procedures, like savings, occurred mostly amongst well-built companies.
There are equally negative as well as positive aspects of improved incorporation into the global economy as was apparent in the situation of Latin America. Among the several positive features is that there has been an added sum of outside finance available to less developed countries in contrast with the 1980s as well as perhaps in assessment with earlier years. This unperturbed the foreign exchange restraint that had held back development during the 1980s. In addition, an escalating share of the recent funds has comprised of foreign direct outlay that is at present highly valued by the administration of the majority of less developed countries. At slightest, globalization contributes to the capital accretion process and thus makes achievable higher development both in the future and at present. In addition, such venture tends to exemplify new technologies that augment the production and, consequently, the competitiveness of developing countries. In an appealing recent paper, and in contrast to usual discernment, it has also been disputed that the ever-increasing role of the capital markets (particularly institutional investors who trade in stock and bonds) may possibly be well-suited with transparent and democratic government than is frequently believed (Maxfield, 1999).
Undeniably, the dispute is that capital markets might essentially add up to democracy by dismantling oligopolistic corporate formation in less developed countries, and that the demand for additional information on the part of overseas investors (in addition to the IMF) might boost both the public and private-sector transparency. On the other hand, it appears clear that there are also grave problems that are being initiated in the new trade and wealth flows along with the way they impact on the societies and economies of developing countries. One of the problems is the increase in polarization or heterogeneity across countries and regions as well as also within countries. A number of them are much more competent than others to seize the benefit of the new offered by globalization opportunities, which can eventually lead to improved political and social conflicts and refusal of globalization and liberalization per se, as evident in a number of cases.
The existence of new capital flows has caused the government problems in the process of trying to manage their respective economies. Macroeconomic exertions have been acknowledged in several cases during the 1990s with the clearest combination being the role of capital inflows, and how they contribute to the overvaluation of exchange rates, that usually end up in diminishing competitiveness and, in severe cases, to the crises of foreign exchanges. In adding together, the unpredictability of capital flows helps to magnify the characteristically pro-cyclical character of macroeconomic policy, which in addition can lead to crises. In the event there is a weak financial supervision, then the banking crises will further complicate the foreign exchange crises.
Both international and local policy changes are required to contract with the new situation. According to Rodrik, one of the most prolific as well interesting globalization analysts has put it suggested that “Openness to the world economy can be the source of many economic benefitsâ€¦. But these are only potential benefits, to be realized in full only when the complementary policies and institutions are in place domestically” (1999, p. 1; see also Rodrik, 1997).
Internationally, on the trade front, it is imperative to gain back momentum following the debacle of the world trade negotiations held in Seattle. It is very essential to realize the change in outlook on several developing countries with reverence to the Seattle meeting. Liberalization, on the other hand has benefited the less developed countries by being the major campaigners of international trade opportunity in view of the fact that they require markets if they are to persists in pursuing export-led growth as well as expand the benefits to encompass other parts of the economy. They view industrialized countries as favouring the aspect of trade liberalization, only in the instance that it directly benefits them.
In the global financial arena, a number of suggestions have been tabled with the intention of coming up with a “new international financial architecture.” The fundamental idea is that inventive regulations of global capital flows, particularly short-term flows, are required to avert the great unpredictability that the world has witnessed in the last few years. Whereas such unpredictability can cause harm to all the economies, and this to this effect, the less developed countries are the least well positioned to deal with the cost. In addition, new means are needed to deal with crises, immediately they are developed. Regardless of much concentration at the stature of the so-called Asian crisis, nothing has in actuality emerged therefore far since the crisis ambience has subsided. If international solutions are not established, developing countries have no option but to try to an alternative at the regional as well as the country levels. In trade, local incorporation turned out to be of much higher priority in both Asia and Latin America. In addition, eastern and central European countries have a much higher priority in Latin America and in Asia. Central and Eastern European countries are also trying to join the European Union.
At the same time, regional groupings as well as individual countries ought to come up with need policies that will guard themselves from the vagaries of international capital flows and volatility. Controls on the way in of short-term capital flows all through the periods of strong international liquidity have been useful and applied in several instances. Also there is need for superior domestic savings in the majority of the less developed countries to decrease the requirement for external savings. Ultimately, policies are essential to offset the schism that is being aggravated by international financial flows. These employ both social policies mostly education and strategy to assist firms being left behind in the progressively more competitive world.
The inferences of globalisation for a state economy are many. Globalisation has increased the competition as well as the interdependence between economies in the world market. This is reflected in Interdependence in consideration to trading in services and goods and in society of capital. As a consequence domestic economic progress is not firm completely by domestic policies and the prevailing market conditions. To a definite extent, they are predisposed by both international and domestic policies and economic conditions. It is therefore clear that a globalising economy, the process of formulating as well as evaluating its domestic policy cannot afford to overlook the potential actions and reactions of policy and expansion to the rest of the world. This inhibited the policy option accessible to the government which entails loss of policy self-sufficiency to some degree, in making decision at the national level.